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Researchers Should Make Thoughtful Assessments  
Instead of Null-Hypothesis Significance Tests 
 
Abstract 
Null-hypothesis significance tests (NHSTs) have received much criticism, especially 
during the last two decades. Yet, many behavioral and social scientists are unaware that NHSTs 
have drawn increasing criticism, so this essay summarizes key criticisms. The essay also 
recommends alternative ways of assessing research findings. Although these recommendations 
are not complex, they do involve ways of thinking that many behavioral and social scientists find 
novel. Instead of making NHSTs, researchers should adapt their research assessments to specific 
contexts and specific research goals, and then explain their rationales for selecting assessment 
indicators. Researchers should show the substantive importance of findings by reporting effect 
sizes and should acknowledge uncertainty by stating confidence intervals. By comparing data 
with naïve hypotheses rather than with null hypotheses, researchers can challenge themselves to 
develop better theories. Parsimonious models are easier to understand and they generalize more 
reliably. Robust statistical methods tolerate deviations from assumptions about samples. 
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In the mid 1980s, a professor set out to study the language in annual letters to 
stockholders. Like several other researchers, the professor expected these letters to disclose how 
managers think about their firms’ strategies and performance (Bowman, 1984; Fiol, 1989; 
Salancik and Meindl, 1984). He formulated hypotheses about differences between letters from 
unsuccessful and successful companies, and then he compared letters from companies at risk of 
going bankrupt with letters from successful companies that had closely resembled the failing 
ones a few years earlier. To his surprise, he found no statistically significant differences between 
letters from failing and successful companies. He presented his study to a departmental seminar, 
where participants said they did not find the evidence of no-difference convincing. They 
proposed some new hypotheses and metrics. He incorporated their ideas, but he still found no 
statistically significant differences. 
Repeated lack of support for his theory-based hypotheses led the professor to reframe his 
paper as a study of corporate communications: Companies have reasons to conceal financial 
problems and they hire public-relations professionals to do so. He sent his manuscript to a 
prestigious journal (PJ1). To the professor’s excitement, the editor offered an opportunity to 
revise and resubmit. However, the editor and reviewers did not find the evidence of no-
difference convincing, and they proposed new hypotheses and metrics. The professor followed 
their instructions carefully, but PJ1’s editor and reviewers did not respond enthusiastically to his 
revised manuscript. Again, they proposed new hypotheses and metrics, although this time the 
demanded revisions seemed to be minor. The professor was very hopeful. He revised his 
manuscript carefully and resubmitted it. However, the editor rejected his manuscript, saying the 
research methods had been inadequate. The professor was devastated. 
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Frustrated but determined, the professor submitted his manuscript to another prestigious 
journal (PJ2). This time, he supplemented his argument with ideas from political science 
implying that companies might avoid evaluation. However, the editorial scenario that ensued was 
very similar to the prior one. Twice PJ2's editor offered opportunity to revise and each editorial 
review proposed additional hypotheses and metrics. Twice, the professor revised, following the 
editor's and reviewers' instructions. Finally, the editor rejected the second revision saying the 
research methods had been inadequate. 
The professor put the manuscript into a drawer in his desk, locked the drawer, and 
labeled it “Disaster paper”. It remains there today. 
Determined to surmount statistical hurdles, the professor next analyzed over two 
thousand letters to shareholders, and the large sample yielded many significant results. The paper 
won an award for being the best one published in a very prestigious journal that year. However, 
the professor thought that his study had found only very small effects. 
To the professor’s despair, his third study again yielded statistically insignificant results. 
This time, the professor hired a time-series statistician. After several analyses with different 
statistical methods and models, they found a pattern of results and published it in a prestigious 
journal. 
The professor drew lessons from these experiences. Firstly, reviewers are more likely to 
approve of research methods when studies reject null hypotheses. Secondly, reviewers insist that 
studies must find differences, even when no-difference has important substantive implications. 
Thirdly, quantitative research was liable to produce findings that he did not trust. He also sensed 
that such quantitative research might make him highly cynical. He knew scholars who seemed to 
view their own statistical studies cynically and he did not like that prospect. 
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The professor’s experiences with these three articles induced him to shy away from 
quantitative tests of hypotheses. Instead, the professor focused on developing conceptual papers. 
Several of these won “best paper awards” and appeared in prestigious journals. One award 
winner, which has received more than 1400 citations, used simple graphs as evidence. 
Underlying the professor's story are major problems with null-hypothesis statistical tests 
(NHSTs). This essay outlines deficiencies and harmful effects of NHSTs and recommends ways 
to make quantitative research more satisfying and fruitful. Arguments against NHSTs are not 
novel, but many researchers are unaware of these arguments and they do not see the harm that 
NHSTs create. Recognition of NHSTs’ deficiencies is critical for advancement of quantitative 
research in behavioral and social research. Therefore, the next section of this essay outlines 
problematic properties of NHSTs and the ensuing section considers why efforts to move beyond 
NHSTs have been unsuccessful. 
The essay then proposes several ways to improve assessment of research findings while 
overcoming deficiencies of NHSTs. These recommendations for methodological improvement 
are not complex, but they involve ways of thinking that may be new to many behavioral and 
social scientists. The essay’s most important recommendation is that researchers should stop 
relying on NHSTs and think carefully about what assessments are most meaningful in their 
specific contexts. 
WHAT’S WRONG WITH NHSTS ANYWAY? 
NHSTs have been controversial since Fisher (1925) proposed them. For instance, famed 
statisticians Neyman and Pearson argued in the late 1920s that it makes no sense to test a null 
hypothesis without testing alternative hypotheses (Hubbard and Bayarri, 2003). However, 
probably because he integrated NHSTs into his very popular textbook, Fisher was able to 
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persuade many to adopt NHSTs. Complaints about NHSTs have multiplied over time (Cohen, 
1994; Greenwald, 1975; Schmidt and Hunter, 1997; Schwab and Starbuck, 2009; Seth et al., 
2009; Thompson, 1999b). However, statistics textbooks have continued to teach their use, and 
many behavioral and social researchers remain unaware that NHSTs have been subject to strong 
criticism (Kline, 2004; Fidler, 2005). 
NHSTs cause both conceptual and practical problems. The following sections highlight 
conceptual problems of NHSTs related to dichotomous conceptions of truth, sample size 
sensitivities, and implausible null hypotheses. 
Conceptual Problem 1: NHSTs portray research findings as clear-cut 
Paradoxically, an assessment procedure designed for uncertainty about the implications 
of data does not formally allow for uncertainty about the correctness of hypotheses or ranges of 
knowledge. Supposedly, data are either “statistically significant” or not so. 
Available data define a distribution of probable values for each population parameter of 
interest. NHSTs replace this distribution with sharply delineated ranges of possible versus 
impossible values: a confidence interval. NHSTs then portray truth as dichotomous and definite 
when they either reject or fail to reject null hypotheses. As Tukey (1991: 100) stated, “The worst, 
i. e., most dangerous, feature of ‘accepting the null hypothesis’ is giving up of explicit 
uncertainty.  . . . Mathematics can sometimes be put in such black-and-white terms, but our 
knowledge or belief about the external world never can.” 
Of course, many researchers mitigate these dichotomies by using different levels of 
significance – 0.05, 0.01, 0.001. However, at any specified level, significance remains 
dichotomous, and presence of multiple levels creates dilemmas. Is a null hypothesis rejected at 
0.01 more incorrect than one rejected at 0.05? 
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Any arbitrary threshold for rejecting null hypotheses can amplify very small differences 
in data into very large differences in implications. In an extreme case, researchers might fail to 
reject a null hypothesis if data have a probability of 0.0505 and reject this null hypothesis if data 
have a probability of 0.0495. Such sharp distinctions ignore the possibility that an assumed 
probabilistic process is an inexact portrayal of events that generated the data or the possibility 
that data give an inexact portrayal of studied phenomena. As Rosnow and Rosenthal (1989: 
1277) conjectured: 
"That is, we want to underscore that, surely, God loves the .06 nearly as much as the .05. 
Can there be any doubt that God views the strength of evidence for or against the null as 
a fairly continuous function of the magnitude of p?"  
Conceptual Problem 2: Most NHSTs let apparent validity of findings depend on 
researchers’ efforts to obtain enough data 
In the late 1930s, Berkson (1938) noticed that he could obtain a statistically significant 
Chi-squared test by increasing sample size. Since then, researchers have found this sensitivity to 
sample size in all forms of NHSTs. As Mayo (2006: 808-809) expressed the situation, “With 
large enough sample size, an α significant rejection of H0 can be very probable, even if the 
underlying discrepancy from µ0 is substantively trivial. In fact, for any discrepancy from the 
null, however small, one can find a sample size such as there is a high probability (as high as one 
likes) that the test will yield a statistically significant result (for any p-value one wishes).” 
Extreme sample-size sensitivity occurs with so-called “point-null hypotheses,” which are 
tested very, very frequently by behavioral and social researchers. A point-null hypothesis defines 
an infinitesimal point on a continuum. Typical point-null hypotheses postulate that a correlation, 
frequency, regression coefficient, mean difference, or variance difference equals zero. All ‘two-
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tailed tests’ of continuous variables incorporate point-null hypotheses because they require a 
statistic to exactly equal another statistic or a specific number. 
A researcher who gathers a large enough sample can reject any point-null hypothesis. 
This property of NHSTs follows directly from the fact that a point-null hypothesis defines an 
infinitesimal point on a continuum. For a NHST to reject a point-null hypothesis, the 
infinitesimal point corresponding to the null hypothesis must fall outside the confidence interval 
around the sample estimate. As sample size increases, the confidence interval shrinks and 
becomes less and less likely to include the point corresponding to the null hypothesis.  
Imagine a study of two variables that have no relation whatever. Capturing these 
variables involves measurement errors. Such errors might come from conversion of theoretical 
constructs into measurement instruments, from rounding of measurements, or from errors by 
people who provide data. Measurement errors mean that the sample estimate of the correlation 
between the variables is very unlikely to be exactly zero, although it may differ from zero by 
only a tiny amount. Thus, if current data do not already reject the point-null hypotheses, 
additional observations will reduce the confidence interval . . . until NHSTs reject the null 
hypothesis that the correlation is zero. 
A central philosophical issue is whether researchers’ efforts and motivation should be 
sufficient to render research findings worthy of being classified as true or not true. A researcher 
with enough data is certain to find statistically significant results – even if these findings result 
from noise in data or from a systematic effect too small to have practical or theoretical relevance. 
Many researchers tailor their data gathering to obtain statistical significance. Webster and 
Starbuck (1988) found that the mean correlation in studies with fewer than 70 observations is 
about twice the mean correlation in studies with over 180 observations. 
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Indeed, where measurement errors are moderately large, statistical significance can come 
from medium-large samples, and computer-based data management and data analysis facilitate 
large samples. Thus, modern technology is helping researchers to convert random measurement 
errors into significant findings. After reviewing articles published in one prestigious journal, Seth 
et al. (2009) surmised that a substantial fraction of articles has samples large enough to make 
substantively trivial differences statistically significant. 
Conceptual Problem 3: Most NHSTs disprove hypotheses that could not possibly be correct 
Most NHSTs rely on null hypotheses that could not possibly be correct, but when a null 
hypothesis offers an implausible description of reality, rejecting it provides no information 
(Lykken, 1968). For example, problems such as those at Worldcom and Enron stimulated 
research to link firms’ performance with governance practices or signs of opportunism. 
However, such studies tested the implausible null hypotheses that governance practices have no 
effect whatever on firms’ performance. As Tukey (1991: 100) pointed out: "All we know about 
the world teaches us that the effects of A and B are always different  in some decimal place  for 
any A and B. Thus asking 'Are the effects different' is foolish." 
The important research questions are not whether any effects occur but whether these 
effects are large enough to matter. Generally, the challenge in behavioral and social research is 
not to find any factors that have even tiny effects on dependent variables, but to identify factors 
that have substantial effects and to observe the directions of these effects. 
Although some researchers believe that NHSTs falsify incorrect hypotheses as Popper 
advocated, use of impossible null hypotheses means that NHSTs violate Popper’s requirements. 
Popper’s (1959) most important criterion was that, to be considered scientific, theories need to 
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perform well in risky tests. Typical significance tests are not risky because null hypotheses are 
tested rather than researchers’ alternative hypotheses. 
Some defenders of NHSTs have argued that they would not cause problems if only 
people would apply them correctly (e.g., Aguinis et al., 2009). However, NHSTs’ conceptual 
deficiencies are inherent and even when applied correctly, NHSTs do not make reliable 
differentiations between important and unimportant effects. In addition to conceptual problems, 
several practical problems arise when researchers try to apply NHSTs. The following sections 
outline practical problems related to interpretation of NHST results, differentiation between 
trivial and important findings, violation of statistical assumptions, and effects of NHSTs on 
researchers' motivation and ethics. 
Practical Problem 1: NHSTs are difficult to understand and often misinterpreted 
NHSTs are difficult to understand because they involve double negatives and null 
hypotheses that are obviously false. Many people have more difficulty with double negatives 
than with positive assertions. Disproving the impossible – a meaningless null hypothesis – is 
such unusual logic that it makes many people uncomfortable. And it should. 
A user of a NHST specifies a null hypothesis, and then argues that observed data would 
be very unlikely if this null hypothesis were true. Often, however, elementary logic or direct 
experience says the null hypothesis cannot be even approximately true: If so, a finding of 
statistical significance states that observed data would be very unlikely if the impossible would 
occur. 
It is small wonder that many researchers, as well as the public, invent ways to inject sense 
into this apparent nonsense. One common version of such sensemaking interprets the 
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significance level (e.g., 0.05) as the probability that the null hypothesis is true given the data, 
Pr(Null | Data). According to Bayes’ Theorem, this probability is 
Pr(Null | Data) = Pr(Data | Null) * [Pr(Null) / Pr(Data)] 
NHSTs compute the second term in this equation, Pr(Data | Null), the probability that the data 
would occur if the null hypothesis were true. However, there is no way to compute Pr(Null | 
Data) from knowledge of Pr(Data | Null) because both Pr(Null) and Pr(Data) are unknown. 
Pr(Data) is always unknown. Pr(Null) is unknown unless the null hypothesis is impossible, in 
which case both Pr(Null) = 0 and Pr(Null | Data) = 0. However, if a null hypothesis is 
impossible, one does not need data or a statistical test to reject it. 
Empirical research has documented that many people do not understand NHSTs or the 
term 'statistical significance'. Studies of misinterpretation have been conducted by Armstrong 
(2007), Fidler et al. (2005), Hubbard and Armstrong (2006), Haller and Krauss (2002), Oakes 
(1986), and Vacha-Haase et al. (2000). Researchers frequently publish incorrect interpretations 
of significance tests, and researchers who review manuscripts often misinterpret them. 
Researchers may use NHSTs incorrectly because incorrect usage is what they have often seen 
and believe to be proper. The result is widespread confusion about NHSTs, by the public and by 
people who have studied statistics, including even some professional statisticians. 
Practical Problem 2: NHSTs highlight trivial findings 
Another version of sensemaking about NHSTs has researchers or the public mistaking 
statistical significance for the theoretical importance of a finding or its practical usefulness. 
Many studies report statistically significant effects that are too small to be of theoretical or 
practical interest. Seth et al. (2009: 5) surveyed papers published in a prestigious journal during 
2007. They concluded, ". . . most strategy scholars emphasize only statistical significance as the 
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criterion of importance in examining empirical results, and ignore substantive or economic 
significance. Only 12 percent of the empirical studies used other criteria of importance in 
addition to considering statistical significance using t- or F-statistics." 
NHSTs provide only crude discrimination between important findings and unimportant 
ones. Empirical findings resemble a large haystack that contains both straws and needles, and 
NHSTs are the sieve that most researchers use to identify needles. To separate needles from 
straws effectively, researchers need sieves that reject almost all straws while identifying most 
needles (Hubbard and Armstrong, 1992). 
Webster and Starbuck (1988) looked at the haystack of relationships studied by 
organizational researchers and applied psychologists, at least the published part of the haystack. 
They examined 14,897 correlations obtained by researchers who published in Administrative 
Science Quarterly, Academy of Management Journal, and Journal of Applied Psychology. These 
were all correlations among all variables studied, not only variables in researchers’ hypotheses. 
In all three journals, the correlations had very similar distributions, with both the mean and the 
median correlations close to +0.09. That 69% of the correlations were positive implies that 
researchers invert scales retrospectively or anticipate signs of relationships prospectively, both of 
which would invalidate a null hypothesis of zero correlation. To find statistical significance 
within such distributions of correlations is easy, especially so because researchers obtain larger 
samples when they have smaller correlations. Imagine that a researcher starts with a target 
variable and searches randomly in these distributions of correlations for a second variable that 
correlates significantly with the target, using sample sizes that resemble those reported in actual 
studies. Random search has a 67% chance of finding a statistically significant correlation on the 
first try, and a 96% chance of finding a statistically significant correlation within three tries. 
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Many editors and reviewers for academic journals are actually making discrimination 
worse by refusing to publish manuscripts that fail to reject null-hypotheses (Greenwald, 1975) 
and refusing to publish successful or failed replications (Starbuck, 1994). By not publishing 
failed replications or failed extensions into slightly different contexts, journals deprive the 
research community of opportunities to observe such failures (Rousseau et al., 2008; Starbuck 
2006). This behavior distorts meta-analyses of multiple studies – a key methodology for 
aggregating knowledge. Editorial practices also encourage proliferation of theoretical 
explanations that have dubious empirical support. NHSTs tend to show that an advocated 
hypothesis is one of many hypotheses consistent with data, a demonstration that is likely to 
create a premature belief that the advocated hypothesis is the best hypothesis. 
Scarcity of replication studies in the social sciences allows NHSTs to confer deceptive 
importance on random errors, idiosyncratic factors, and very small effects (Hubbard and 
Armstrong, 1992). In medical research, however, a few appraisals indicate that many published 
studies reported findings that later studies could not replicate (Ioannidis, 2003, 2005a, 2005b; 
Wacholder et al., 2004). Colhoun, McKeigue, and Smith (2003) estimated that as many as 95% 
of reported associations between diseases and genetic properties are false positives. Ioannidis 
(2005a) reported that later research has disconfirmed 37% of the most cited and discussed 
medical treatments. After several studies of medical treatments that had been falsely overrated at 
first, Ioannidis (2005b: e124) asserted, “There is increasing concern that in modern medical 
research, false findings may be the majority or even the vast majority of published research 
claims. However, this should not be surprising. It can be proven that most claimed research 
findings are false.” 
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Practical Problem 3: NHSTs obscure important findings  
In addition to NHSTs' tendency to assign “significance” to trivial findings, NHSTs also 
classify substantively important findings as “not significant”. 
Again, medical research has made valuable replication studies. For example, when 
doctors began to prescribe hormones to counteract menopausal symptoms, initial assessment 
studies found only weak evidence of harmful effects, which was not statistically significant, and 
conjectured benefits expanded to include cardiovascular disease, age-related dementias, 
osteoporosis, and colon cancer. As a result, doctors prescribed hormone therapies for many 
women. After several years, however, sufficient evidence accumulated to reveal that estrogen 
and progestin therapies, especially after long-term use, foster breast cancer, strokes, and heart 
disease (Greiser et al., 2005; Shah et al. 2005). Obviously, women who suffered such 
consequences may not have regarded them as insignificant. 
When outcomes have severe positive or negative consequences, thresholds for 
considering them worthy of attention should be low. When outcomes have trivial positive or 
negative consequences, thresholds for considering them worthy of attention should be high. 
NHSTs with fixed significance thresholds ignore important trade-offs between costs and benefits 
of research outcomes. Especially troublesome are analytic procedures, such as step-wise 
regression, that rely on such fixed significance thresholds to choose variables to include in 
models (Thompson, 1995). Such choices equate statistical significance with substantive 
importance. 
Practical Problem 4: NHSTs make assumptions that much research does not satisfy 
Nonreflective use of NHSTs has promoted applications with nonrandom samples or with 
samples that comprise large fractions of populations. NHSTs with non-random samples have no 
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meaningful interpretation because means and variances computed from sample data bear no 
knowable relationship to the means and variances of the population. Only with genuinely random 
samples does statistical theory afford researchers a basis for drawing probability inferences about 
population parameters. 
One prevalent misuse of NHSTs occurs when a researcher gains access to data from a 
complete subpopulation. For instance, Mezias and Starbuck (2003) obtained data from all senior 
executives in four divisions of a very large company. With such data, the researchers could learn 
nothing by making NHSTs. They could compute the means and variances of the data from each 
division exactly. For such statistics, confidence intervals have a width of zero. On the other hand, 
the researchers had no basis in statistical theory for claims about other executives within or 
outside the company or for claims about the world population of executives. 
Three of the four authors of this essay have had to deal with journal reviewers who 
demanded NHSTs even though their data comprised either complete populations or large 
portions of populations. When data include complete populations, sample means are population 
means and sampling error is zero. Consequently, NHSTs become completely irrelevant. Similar, 
but less extreme, effects occur when a random sample comprises a large fraction of a population 
of known size. In such instances, researchers ought to apply correction factors to account for the 
fact that sample statistics become increasingly good estimators of population statistics when a 
sample size approaches population size. However, one almost never sees such corrections in 
published research. 
These issues have grown in importance as researchers have gained access to large 
databases for financial statistics, proxy statements, patents, and other organizational records. For 
instance, studies of governance, innovation, and top-management teams have examined samples 
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such as all Fortune 250 firms, all S&P 500 firms, all publicly traded US manufacturing 
companies, or all US patents issued during a specific time period. These are not random samples. 
If population data are complete, such studies examine populations, and NHSTs provide no 
information about possible findings during other periods or in other populations. If data are 
incomplete, missing data are more likely to have common properties than to be random. 
Practical Problem 5: NHSTs corrode researchers’ motivation and ethics 
NHSTs’ most harmful effect may be erosion of researchers’ devotion to their vocations. 
Repeated and very public misuse of NHSTs creates cynicism and confusion. Unjustified 
applications of NHSTs bring rewards and justified deviations from these practices attract extra 
scrutiny followed by rejection. Frequently, research seminars drift into debates about statistical 
nuances while participants ignore the substantive importance of findings. Success in research can 
become a mere game played to achieve promotion or visibility, not a high calling in pursuit of 
useful knowledge and societal benefit. 
Of course, any methodology could create harmful effects if many people misuse it 
consistently, and some individual researchers will always embrace game playing. However, 
NHSTs have especially troublesome properties -- both conceptual and practical. Collectively, 
these properties make fertile ground for disillusionment and cynical opportunism. 
The problems associated with NHSTs and their harmful effects create mysteries. Why 
have researchers persisted in using such troublesome methods? Why have researchers failed to 
adopt better ways to assess research? 
WHY DO SO MANY RESEARCHERS CLING TO NHSTS? 
Not everyone uses or endorses NHSTs. During recent years, NHSTs have drawn active 
opposition in biology, education, forecasting, medicine, and psychology (e.g., Armstrong, 2007; 
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Cohen, 1994; Cortina and Folger, 1998; Schmidt, 1996; Starbuck, 2006). Yet NHSTs have 
continued to dominate statistical practice in the life, behavioral, social, and economic sciences. 
Unfortunately, many researchers believe NHSTs are adequate. Methodology courses do not 
teach alternatives to NHSTs. Institutionalized practices tolerate or endorse NHSTs. Even 
researchers who are aware of NHSTs limitations tend to underestimate NHSTs’ detrimental 
impacts. 
For most researchers, NHSTs’ apparent adequacy has roots in misconceptions. For 
example, the so-called ‘inverse probability fallacy’ leads researchers to believe that p denotes 
Pr(Null│Data), the probability that the null hypothesis is true given the data. This mistake fosters 
a second incorrect inference, that ‘1 – p = the probability that researchers’ alternative hypothesis 
is true’. Once researchers believe they know the probabilities of their null hypotheses and their 
alternative hypotheses being true, what other information could they possible want? Indeed, 
researchers often take still another unjustifiable leap: They surmise that 1 – p is the probability 
that their substantive theories are correct. This extrapolation assumes that the only alternative to 
the null hypothesis is the alternative that researchers themselves articulated. 
Schmidt and Hunter (1997: 37) identified around 80 commonly raised objections to 
discontinuation of NHSTs and argued that none of the objections has validity. Other proponents 
of change have pointed to psychological or social reasons. In a personal communication dated 
August 2002, Meehl blamed “plain psychic inertia”. He said, “If one has been thinking in a 
certain way since he was a senior in college, . . . there is a certain intellectual violence involved 
in telling a person . . . that they’ve been deceiving themselves.” Thompson (1999a: 135) argued 
that substituting statistical significance for theoretical or practical importance allows researchers 
to “finesse the responsibility for and necessity of declaring and exposing to criticism the personal 
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or societal values that inherently must be the basis for any decree that research results are 
valuable.” Likewise, John (1992) proposed that researchers use statistical significance to portray 
their work as “objective” and “scientific” because the tests substitute for decisions about whether 
phenomena are real or effects important. Regarding lack of reporting of confidence intervals, 
John also said that because so much behavioral and social research produces ambiguous findings, 
stating wide confidence intervals exposes researchers to embarrassment and undermines their 
claims to knowledge. 
Arguments such as those above place responsibility for methodological choices on 
individual researchers and they understate the influence of widespread social norms. The very 
prevalence of NHSTs has become a major reason for their continued use. Researchers who use 
NHSTs receive support from their colleagues, journal editors and reviewers, and public media. 
Researchers who eschew NHSTs have to justify their deviant choices and risk having 
manuscripts rejected.  
Methodologists in education, medicine, and psychology have asked their professional 
associations to eliminate NHSTs from their journals (Fidler, 2005; Fidler et al., 2004). In the mid 
1990s, several psychologists well known for their methodological contributions urged American 
Psychological Association (APA) to ban NHSTs from its journals, and APA appointed a task 
force to develop new recommendations about statistical inference. However, after a brief initial 
meeting, the task force promptly announced that it “does not support any action that could be 
interpreted as banning the use of null hypothesis significance testing or p values” (Task Force on 
Statistical Significance, 1996: 2). A later second report by the task force went further in its 
recommendations, but still short of banning NHSTs (Wilkinson, 1999). Finally, the latest version 
of the APA publication manual (2010: 34) states: 
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"For the reader to appreciate the magnitude or importance of a study's findings, it 
is almost always necessary to include some measure of effect size in the Results 
section. Whenever possible, provide a confidence interval for each effect size 
reported to indicate the precision of estimation of the effect size." 
Insights from Medicine’s Reform 
Medical research offers a precedent of rather successful statistical reform. Although some 
medical researchers still use NHSTs, medicine has moved away from sole reliance on NHSTs. 
Nearly all medical studies now state confidence intervals and researchers attempt to estimate the 
substantive importance of their findings (Fidler et al., 2004). 
One force furthering change was strong interventions by journal editors. The most visible 
and controversial of these editors was Rothman. As editor of American Journal of Public Health, 
Rothman’s revise-and-resubmit letters to authors stated: “All references to statistical hypothesis 
testing and statistical significance should be removed from the papers. I ask that you delete p 
values as well as comments about statistical significance. If you do not agree with my standards 
(concerning the inappropriateness of significance tests) you should feel free to argue the point, or 
simply ignore what you may consider to be my misguided view, by publishing elsewhere.” 
(Fleiss, 1986: 559; Shrout, 1997: 1). Later, Rothman (1998: 334) became editor of another 
journal, where he announced: “When writing for Epidemiology, you can enhance your prospects 
if you omit tests of statistical significance. … In Epidemiology, we do not publish them at all. 
Not only do we eschew publishing claims of the presence or absence of statistical significance, 
we discourage the use of this type of thinking in the data analysis, such as in the use of stepwise 
regression.” During 2000, Epidemiology published not a single p value, and 94% of empirical 
articles reported confidence intervals (Fidler et al., 2004). 
Surprisingly, Rothman’s policies established behavioral patterns that persisted after he 
left those journals, and they influenced the policies of other journals. Opposition to NHSTs 
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continued for many years and it came from many medical researchers, journal editors, and 
societies. Rather than offering mere suggestions, editors of medical journals spoke of 
‘requirements’ and ‘expectations’. For example, Langman (1986: 716) at British Medical 
Journal (BMJ) said, “…from 1 July authors of papers submitted to the BMJ will be expected to 
calculate confidence intervals whenever the data warrant this approach”. 
Editorial policies may have to be quite strict in order to elicit behavioral change. In 
contrast to editors of medical journals, editors of psychology journals have generally encouraged 
behavioral change instead of requiring it. For instance, when Kendall tried to enact changes at 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology (JCCP), he (1997: 3) advised authors: 
“Evaluations of the outcomes of psychological treatments are favorably enhanced when the 
published report includes not only statistical significance and the required effect size but also a 
consideration of clinical significance”. His encouragements had much weaker effects than 
Rothman’s requirements. Just 40% of JCCP’s authors reported on clinical significance (Fidler et 
al., 2004). Thompson (1999b: 162) argued that mere encouragement amounts to a “self-
cancelling message”. He said, “To present an ‘encouragement’ in the context of strict absolute 
standards regarding the esoterics of author note placement, pagination, and margins is to the send 
the message, ‘these myriad requirements count, this encouragement doesn’t.’” 
Requirements, bans, or mandates about statistical reporting have often drawn negative 
reactions. Even some advocates of statistical reform in psychology have viewed requirements as 
impinging on researchers’ intellectual freedom. Although embedded norms that support NHSTs 
also limit academic freedom, researchers and the public have become accustomed to their 
effects. 
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After a comprehensive study of efforts to change statistical practices in ecology, 
medicine, and psychology, Fidler et al. (2004: 615) concluded: “The nature of the editorial 
policies and the degree of collaboration amongst editors are important factors in explaining the 
varying levels of reforms in these disciplines. But without efforts to also re-write textbooks, 
improve software and research understanding of alternative methods, it seems unlikely that 
editorial initiatives will achieve substantial statistical reform.” Capraro and Capraro (2002) found 
that statistical textbooks still strongly emphasize statistical significance testing over effect size 
estimation. Indeed, a third of the textbooks did not cover effect-size estimation at all. 
Yet another factor lurks just off-stage during discussions of why medical research has 
changed and behavioral and social research has not. Medical research is more expensive, 
receives much more funding, makes more of a difference to more people, and draws much more 
attention. Thus, medical researchers have greater incentive to measure and document effects of 
their work and to avoid promulgating treatments that turn out later to have been ineffective or 
harmful. 
The next section recommends methodological changes to improve on NHSTs. These 
recommendations do not represent a comprehensive agenda for methodological change, but they 
provide guidance for individual researchers who are interested in advancing their research 
methodology and a starting point for more comprehensive methodological discussions and 
institutional change. 
HOW CAN RESEARCHERS DO BETTER? 
Any nonreflective way of assessing research is destined to prove ineffective for the entire 
range of behavioral and social sciences because it cannot accommodate diverse contingencies 
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and exhibit a spectrum of nuances. Any approach to research assessment that allows for 
contingencies and nuances has to meet challenges from different consumers of research. 
For example, because studies had suggested that many health-care professionals give 
patients incorrect or confusing advice about nutrition, Cadman and Findlay (1998) investigated 
effects of training on nurses’ knowledge about nutrition. They assessed nurses’ knowledge, 
provided training to the nurses, and then reassessed the nurses’ knowledge. On average, nurses 
scored 21% higher on the reassessment, and nurses' confidence in their knowledge rose from 
27% to 88%. These changes led the researchers to propose that the nurses’ employer should 
provide such training. 
NHSTs for such a problem would test the point-null hypothesis that training has no effect 
at all, and most researchers would interpret statistical significance as adequate evidence that 
training is useful. Of course, NHSTs do not justify such a conclusion. The relevant question is 
not whether training had any effect, but whether the effect was strong enough and consistent 
enough to justify using organizational resources for such training. 
In addition, a focus on statistical significance tends to suppress reporting of nuances. In 
the study of nurses, two dieticians trained 59 nurses working in 30 medical practices, so 
researchers could have described variations across individuals, sites, and trainers. For instance, 
across practices measured change in knowledge ranged from -23% to +73%. Either some nurses 
actually exhibited less knowledge after training or measurements of knowledge lacked reliability. 
The study of nurses did not assess consequences for patients; researchers merely assumed 
that patients would benefit. They also assumed that nurses who are more confident of their 
knowledge possess better knowledge; they did not examine the correlation between confidence 
and the correctness of knowledge. Since nurses’ confidence rose much more dramatically than 
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their knowledge scores, and since only a few nurses scored above 80% on the test of knowledge 
even after training, training may have created unjustified confidence with potential negative 
consequences for misinformed patients. 
Good research requires using different methodologies and assessment criteria in different 
contexts and probing deeply for diverse implications. A single methodology is likely to be 
inappropriate for many, if not most, studies. Thus, the sections to follow describe versatile 
practices that promise to improve on use of NHSTs. These recommendations concern assessment 
of findings and they follow rather directly from problems discussed above. 
Recommendation 1: Tailor assessment to research context 
An apparent advantage of statistical significance is that researchers can describe it in 
much the same way no matter what contexts or phenomena they study. Participants in research 
seminars believe they can understand presented findings without much knowledge of studies’ 
variables or contexts. Unfortunately, such research descriptions are superficial and apparent 
comprehension is illusory. People are talking and using familiar words without appreciating how 
these meanings shift from context to context. 
To prevent superficial assessment, researchers need to account for relationships between 
contexts they study and actions that their findings might stimulate (Breaugh, 2003). The 
following questions suggest starting points for giving research findings more meaning. 
What metrics make sense for dependent variables? Researchers should describe the 
effects on dependent variables in the same units that they use to measure the dependent variables 
– tons, numbers of people, bales, or barrels.  
In the special case of random samples with arbitrary scales, researchers can standardize 
all variables and describe effects probabilistically. For example, ‘ceteris paribus, a one-standard-
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deviation change in student motivation produces a change in knowledge confidence that is 
between -0.16 and +0.23 standard deviations’. Some methodologists have been seeking 
dimensionless measures of effect size such as likelihood ratios or correlation coefficients. 
However, researchers should remain cautious about unobserved or unremarked differences 
between studied settings that can create deceptive illusions of comparability across studies. 
For whom do effects have relevance? The researchers who studied nutrition knowledge 
wanted to improve patients’ health, but they obtained data about nurses not patients. None of 
their data related directly to patients’ health. However, if the researchers had tried to measure 
changes in patients’ health, the connection to training would have been remote and the number 
and importance of confounding influences would have been high. Aguinis et al. (2009) have 
recommended that researchers ought to distinguish between effect size and practical significance 
and assess them separately. 
Should researchers relate benefits of effects to the costs of those effects? Training of 
nurses in nutrition is not costless; at a minimum, nurses could be learning other information or 
skills. Findings stated in cost/benefit terms have more direct relevance for decisions, so when 
their studies do not capture cost and benefits directly, researchers should consider estimating 
costs and benefits based on anecdotal or simulation data. To compare benefits with costs, 
researchers need to state changes in dependent and independent variables in comparable units. 
However, benefits and costs are often multidimensional, and equivalence can be difficult to 
establish. For example, training of nurses creates both monetary costs and opportunity costs in 
terms of nurses’ time, and neither of these costs translates readily into the value of nutrition 
knowledge for patients’ health. 
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Would multiple assessments be informative? In most studies, different indicators reveal 
complementary aspects of findings. Researchers’ challenge is to enhance readers’ understanding 
by balancing simplicity against depth. Simplicity enhances clarity whereas complexity fosters 
future research and further development of indicators. 
Recommendation 2: Report uncertainty associated with effect size 
'Effect size' denotes an attempt to estimate the change in a dependent variable that results 
from change in an independent variable. For example, ‘after training, nurses’ knowledge scores 
increased by an average of 21%, but 95% confidence limits for individual nurses ranged from a 
loss of -41% to a gain of +95%’. 
Researchers need to think creatively about appropriate ways to estimate effects in their 
studies. Although researchers have proposed several indicators for effect size (Cortina and Nouri, 
1999; Ellis, 2009; Grissom and Kim, 2005), many proposed indicators focus on differences 
between two discrete treatments whereas much behavioral and social research does not compare 
discrete treatments. Researchers should also beware that proponents of various indicators have 
tended to propose using them with NHSTs. 
Researchers should report the uncertainty attending their findings. When data are random 
samples, one way to communicate this uncertainty is reporting of confidence intervals. Thus, 
many methodologists and an increasing number of journals recommend reporting confidence 
intervals for effect sizes (American Educational Research Association, 2006; American 
Psychological Association, 2010). ). Various methodologists distribute software that can perform 
such calculations (e.g., Algina and Keselman, 2003; Cumming and Finch, 2001; Smithson, 2001; 
Steiger and Fouladi, 1992; Thompson, 2002). A disadvantage of confidence intervals is that 
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researchers can interpret them as justifying binary judgments about what is true or false, and thus 
to make NHSTs covertly. 
Instead of confidence intervals, researchers can report likelihood ratios, posterior 
probability distributions, or entire distributions of inferences (Jeffreys and Berger, 1992). For 
example, Soofi, Nystrom, and Yasai-Ardekani (2009) analyzed executives’ expectations about 
economic change, the impact on their firms, and their firms’ possible responses. The researchers 
used graphs to show estimated values of uncertainty across all 93 executives, and to show how 
researchers’ assumptions alter inferences about distributions of uncertainty across executives. 
Bayesian regression analysis led to graphs showing probability distributions of estimated 
regression coefficients. Even without making the large conceptual jump from NHSTs to 
Bayesian inference, researchers can use simple graphs to communicate both size of effects and 
their variability, as the next section describes. 
Recommendation 3: Explain and illustrate assessment indicators 
Prevalence and general acceptance of NHSTs have fostered an impression that 
researchers do not have to explain how they assess research findings. Even researchers who use 
NHSTs should explain why they believe their data satisfy NHSTs’ assumptions and what their p-
values say about their findings. 
To compare treatments or contexts, or to explicate interaction effects, it is useful to graph 
means, confidence limits, or distributions of possible inferences. Cleveland (1985), Darlington 
(1973), Doksum (1977), and Wilk and Gnanades (1968) have proposed graphical methods for 
distributions of effect size. 
Figure 1 shows a conjectured extrapolation of the study of nurses’ knowledge about 
nutrition. The hollow columns represent test scores of 59 nurses before training, and the two 
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kinds of solid columns show test scores after training by either of two trainers. The Figure 
postulates that trainer B is 25% more effective on average than trainer A is. Such a figure 
conveys much more information than would mere numbers, such as means or confidence 
intervals, and it gives audiences a more intuitive appreciation for findings. 
 
Recommendation 4: Compare new data with naïve models rather than null hypotheses 
In place of null hypotheses, researchers can compare their proposed theories with naïve 
hypotheses that require no understanding of studied phenomena. In contrast to null hypotheses 
that claim no effect, naïve hypotheses assume a simple effect that occurs, for example, due to 
stability of social processes, effects of third variables, or random processes. Connor and 
Simberloff (1986: 160) defined a naïve hypothesis (which they called a null model) as "an 
attempt to generate the distribution of values for the variable of interest in the absence of a 
putative causal process." Thus, naïve hypotheses are not supposed to provide satisfying 
explanations but to offer stronger competition than null hypotheses do. Stronger competition 
challenges researchers to develop theories that explain more. 
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Researchers have tested their fields’ knowledge against several types of naïve 
hypotheses. One type proposes that data arise from very simple random processes. In 
organizational ecology, for example, conceptual arguments suggested higher survival rates for 
larger and older organizations. Early studies applied traditional NHSTs and rejected the null 
hypotheses that organizational size and age had no effect on survival rates. However, Levinthal 
(1991) argued that observed differences between survival rates across organizational size and age 
are qualitatively consistent with the naïve hypothesis that organizational survival is a random 
walk. He (1991: 416) concluded that a random walk provides a baseline for assessing causal 
effects of organizational size and age, which exposes more subtle features of size and age 
dependence. 
Powell (2003) combined random processes with other naïve comparisons. Much research 
has investigated persistence of exceptional performance by business firms, and traditional 
NHSTs rejected the null hypothesis that all firms perform equally well. Powell (2003) compared 
data about success patterns among Fortune 500 firms with several naïve hypotheses about the 
distribution of performance. He produced naïve hypotheses analytically (based on simple Pareto-
like growth models), empirically (based on comparisons to other nonbusiness competitive 
domains, such as sports, politics or beauty pageants), and by simulation (based on stochastic 
processes). When he used these naïve hypotheses, he surmised "that nothing unusual is 
happening in the performance of most industries.  . . . If firm-specific competitive advantages 
exist, they are, in all likelihood, local and extreme phenomena, and highly resistant to useful 
generalization" (Powell, 2003: 83). 
Another type of naïve hypotheses conjectures that crude hypotheses provide at least as 
much useful information as subtle hypotheses. For example, researchers tested elaborate 
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forecasting models against two naïve hypotheses: (1) tomorrow will be the same as today and (2) 
the trend since yesterday will continue until tomorrow (Elliott, 1973; Makridakis et al., 1982; 
Pant and Starbuck, 1990). Thus, longitudinal research designs should consider not only random-
based change patterns, but also state-based and trend-based naïve hypotheses.  
Another useful standard for comparison can be the crude hypothesis that every 
independent variable exerts the same influence on the dependent variable. Using both computer 
simulation and algebraic analyses, psychometricians have discovered (1) that on average, naïve 
'same effect' hypotheses make better predictions about new samples than multiple regression 
does unless the regressions are based on large samples (e.g., n = 160 to 400 or larger) and (2) that 
even when calculated from very large samples, regression coefficients make predictions that are 
only slightly better on average than those made by the 'same effect' hypotheses (Claudy, 1972; 
Dorans and Drasgow, 1978; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1975; Schmidt, 1971). The predictive 
effectiveness of such naïve hypotheses implies that researchers who gather small samples could 
make predictions that are more accurate if they did not even gather data. 
Recommendation 5: To support generalization and replicability, frame hypotheses within 
very simple models 
Researchers often introduce numerous independent variables into their analyses. They 
assume that models with more variables are more accurate because they account for more 
possible influences on data including contingencies and peculiarities of specific situations. 
However, this argument has serious weaknesses. To estimate coefficients with reliable accuracy, 
regression requires independent variables that correlate only weakly or not at all. When two 
independent variables correlate, errors in estimates of one regression coefficient can offset errors 
in estimates of the other coefficient. Thus, the two coefficients may jointly yield a good fit to 
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data even though the individual coefficient estimates are quite inaccurate. Each variable added to 
represent another influence or idiosyncrasy correlates (if only slightly) with other independent 
variables, so regression calculations grow more likely to make unreliable estimates as numbers 
of independent variables increase. Although these effects distort NHSTs, they also distort 
estimates of effect size and confidence intervals, so researchers have reason to simplify their 
analytic models no matter what assessments they intend to make. 
Of course, such effects vary across situations, and quality of research findings depends on 
the quality and properties of data as well as the models used for analysis. Sometimes, statistical 
procedures can help to address multicollinearity concerns (Thompson, 2006). 
However, there are reasons to expect parsimonious models to be both more accurate and 
more understandable. When numbers of independent variables increase, regression calculations 
climb and descend Ockham’s hill, an effect named for William Ockham, a 14th century advocate 
of parsimonious theorizing. Figure 2 outlines the general idea. A model that includes too few 
independent variables fits sample data too loosely: It fails to capture important and explainable 
variation and it makes inaccurate inferences about the population. However, additional variables 
have diminishing returns. When a model starts to include too many independent variables, it fits 
data too tightly: Regression coefficients are more likely to describe random noise or 
idiosyncratic properties that do not generalize to the population even if the added variables have 
statistically significant coefficients. 
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Figure 2. Ockham's Hill
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Gauch (2002, 2006) studied Ockham’s Hills of biological studies via simulations, and he 
found that the models that give the most accurate generalizations are quite parsimonious. To 
reduce effects of correlations among independent variables, Gauch first used factor analysis to 
group independent variables into correlated clusters. Then he compared predictions made by 
regression equations with population properties assumed when generating the original data. His 
studies indicate that only two or three such clusters of variables are optimal for making accurate 
statements about populations. 
Large numbers of independent variables also reduce the ability of researchers and their 
audiences to make logical or intuitive sense of findings (Goldberg, 1970; Meehl, 1954). Even 
researchers who advocate multivariate analyses revert to bivariate and trivariate interpretations 
when they communicate their findings. When Box and Draper (1969) used experiments to 
improve factory efficiency, they deduced that practical experiments should alter only two or 
NHSTs 
 
 32 
three variables at a time because people had trouble interpreting outcomes of experiments 
involving four or more variables. Similarly, Faust (1984) observed that scientists have 
difficulties understanding four-way interactions. He remarked that the greatest theoretical 
contributions in the physical sciences have exhibited parsimony and simplicity rather than 
complexity, and he speculated that parsimonious theories have been very influential not because 
the physical universe is simple but because people can understand simple theories. 
Model parsimony is another area in which social norms appear to be degrading research 
quality. Application of NHSTs has led researchers to test more and more complex models, and 
ease of collecting and analyzing larger samples has stimulated inclusion of additional variables. 
Journal reviewers frequently suggest that researchers add more control variables. An unintended 
outcome has been models that overfit data and findings that are less likely to generalize and 
replicate. 
Behavioral and social scientists have not given parsimony the respect it deserves. Insofar 
as people and organizations can choose their characteristics (e.g., educations, geographic 
locations, governance modes, top management teams), random sampling tends to produce 
correlated variables, which reduce the reliability of statistical analyses. In addition, insofar as 
people and organizations learn, including learning from reading research studies, replication 
becomes very difficult if not impossible. Technologies change endlessly, as do economic 
conditions and political structures and policies. Consequently, sample data come from 
populations that soon will no longer exist. To formulate useful generalizations, researchers need 
to focus on the most fundamental, pervasive, and inertial causal relations. To guide human 
action, researchers need to develop parsimonious and simple models that humans understand. 
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Recommendation 6: Use robust statistics to make estimates, especially robust regression 
Many statistical methods, including NHSTs, assume that actual population distributions 
match hypothetical distributions. These methods give unreliable results when applied to samples 
from populations that do not satisfy their assumptions or when samples are too small to provide 
good representations of their populations. 
For example, all statistical methods that rely heavily on squaring of error terms have 
problems because this squaring raises the influence of low probability extreme events (outliers). 
In particular, ordinary least-squares regression (OLS) may yield inaccurate coefficient estimates 
when sample sizes are smaller than 400 even if sampled populations satisfy OLS's assumptions 
(Einhorn and Hogarth, 1975; Starbuck, 2006). 
If independent variables have skewed distributions, error terms for regression analyses 
converge toward a Normal distribution more slowly as sample size increases, so regressions are 
likely to require larger samples to produce accurate estimates and the likelihood of outliers is 
higher. Especially troublesome are distributions with long tails because they increase the 
probability of outliers. Consequently, the plausibility of assuming Normality of the error term in 
regressions depends upon sample size and the populations from which data arise. When samples 
deviate from the normality assumptions of OLS, estimates of regression coefficients and their 
statistical significance become more inaccurate. 
Researchers can investigate the sensitivity of their inferences to properties of their data. 
For example, they can make trimmed least-squares estimates with different amounts of trimming, 
or they can test the robustness of their findings by selectively excluding some observations from 
their analyses. However, when there are several independent variables, it becomes difficult to 
distinguish outliers from other data. 
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Therefore, over the last three decades, statisticians have been developing estimation 
methods that exhibit robustness in the sense that they produce more accurate estimates than 
traditional methods such as OLS and t-tests (Keselman et al., 2007; Rousseeuw and Leroy, 1987; 
Wilcox, 1997). The most flexible of these methods adapt automatically to data in that they 
behave like traditional methods when data satisfy the assumptions of those methods but behave 
differently when data violate these assumptions. For example, Robust MM regression limits the 
effects of extreme outliers, but when sample data do not include extreme outliers, Robust MM 
regression produces the same coefficient estimates as OLS. (Robust MM regression was 
developed as a modification of maximum likelihood estimation, or M-estimation. The second M 
in MM-estimation symbolizes use of a two-stage process: first choosing a scale parameter to 
minimize a function that estimates potential loss due to outliers, and then making a maximum 
likelihood estimate.) 
Extremely dangerous for conventional statistical analyses are outliers that result from 
large errors in sample data. OLS has the serious liability that a single large error in data can 
greatly distort inferences. In general, measurement errors in independent variables are more 
likely to cause serious distortions than errors in dependent variables. Audits of frequently used 
financial databases have found that (1) companies had errors in their accounting, (2) companies 
reported their accounting data incorrectly, and (3) clerks doing data-entry made typing errors. 
San Miguel (1977), for example, reported a 30% error rate for R&D expenditures on Compustat. 
Rosenberg and Houglet (1974) found that about 2.4% of the stock prices reported by Compustat 
and by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at University of Chicago contained 
errors. Although many of these errors are too small to cause serious concerns, about 0.5% of the 
stock price errors were large enough to invalidate inferences. Rosenberg and Houglet (1974: 
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1303) concluded, "There are a few large errors in both data bases, and these few errors are 
sufficient to change sharply the apparent nature of the data." Again, robust regression procedures 
have the advantage of deemphasizing extreme outliers caused by errors. 
Figure 3 compares the errors in regression coefficients when estimated by OLS (solid 
lines) and by Robust MM (dashed lines) when data contain serious errors. These calculations 
used sample data in which 0.5% of all variables incorporate data-entry errors that shift the 
decimal point one digit right; that is, a random 0.5% of the recorded data are ten times the correct 
data. Heavy lines show average errors and the light lines show quartiles for the errors; 25% of 
the errors in coefficient estimates fall above the upper quartile lines, 25% fall below the lower 
quartile lines, and 50% fall between the two quartile lines. The simulations support statisticians’ 
claims that Robust MM regression does much better than OLS at ignoring unreliable data. (Insert 
footnote.) 
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Figure 3. Percentage Errors in Estimated Regression Coefficients 
With 0.5% of Data Having Extreme Errors
(adapted from Starbuck, 2006)
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THE OPPORTUNITY TO CHANGE 
We began this essay by describing a professor’s struggle with institutional pressures that 
enforced ritualistic use of NHSTs and a strong bias to equate ‘statistically significant’ with 
‘important for theory or practice’. A comprehensive discussion of institutional factors and 
processes that have locked large parts of the social sciences into the unreflective application of 
NHSTs would require another essay. Although NHSTs have been remarkably enduring in the 
face of escalating criticism, we believe change to be inevitable . . . even if painfully slow.  
Progressive defenders of NHSTs continue to argue that wholesale change is not 
necessary, that it is possible to combine NHSTs usefully with measures of effect size (Aguinis et 
al, 2009). Conceptual and practical problems outlined in this paper show why such a 
combination is undesirable. No one has proposed changes to NHSTs that purport to correct the 
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main problems, defenders have been growing fewer, and even defenders acknowledge that 
NHSTs have deficiencies. Arguments supporting NHSTs appeal to values that seem less than 
admirable – such as adherence to tradition, resistance to change, convenience of standardization, 
and disregard for uncertainty.  
Critics of NHSTs have been increasing in numbers and their complaints have been 
growing more visible, so more and more researchers are becoming aware of NHSTs’ 
deficiencies. Arguments against NHSTs appeal to values that seem more admirable – ability to 
cope with complexity, sincerity, willingness to learn, and desire to report findings that matter. 
Whereas methodologists and researchers have asked their professional societies to ban NHSTs, 
no one has asked their professional societies to put more emphasis on NHSTs. Two dozen 
journals in psychology and education now require authors to report effect sizes instead of or in 
addition to significance tests, and several books and articles have appeared that explain how to 
compute effect sizes (Algina and Keselman, 2003; Breaugh, 2003; Cortina and Nouri, 1999; 
Ellis, 2009; Grissom and Kim, 2005; Smithson, 2001). 
In spite of these changes, institutional pressures are still strongly supporting ritualistic use 
of NHSTs as the default instrument to assess research findings. Research that avoids NHSTs and 
instead reports effect sizes, confidence intervals or draws on alternative statistical approaches 
(e.g., Bayesian statistics) continues to face higher levels of scrutiny and substantial skepticism in 
review processes. We believe that institutional change, such as changes in review processes, 
needs grass-root support from individual researchers. 
You do not have to wait patiently for others to bring better methodology into your world. 
When null hypotheses could not possibly be true, you can remark that those NHSTs only show 
that the impossible did not happen. When research examines a population or a nonrandom 
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sample, you can indicate that NHSTs are inappropriate. When findings are not overwhelmingly 
conclusive, you can suggest that uncertainty surrounds what is true and what is false. When 
findings are not statistically significant but they might hold substantive importance, you can 
highlight their potential importance. When researchers do not report effect sizes, you can ask 
how big the effects are. Perhaps most importantly, when your colleagues offer such observations, 
you can support them. Such grass-root support can push necessary institutional changes and help 
to keep studies with important findings out of file drawers labeled "disaster paper". 
"What of the analyst, who may even be a statistician, who says, "This is all about words -
- I may use the bad words, but I always think the proper thoughts, and always act in the 
proper way!" We must reject such a claim as quite inadequate. Unless we can learn to 
keep what we say, what we think, and what we do all matching one another, and 
matching a reasonable picture of the world, we will never find our way safely through the 
thickets of multiple comparisons -- and we will not serve ourselves, our friends, and our 
clients adequately." (Tukey, 1991: 100) 
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Footnote from page 34: Figure 3 is based on 100 samples – 20 samples for each of five sample 
sizes. Curvature of OLS's accuracy depends on error rates; OLS's accuracy relates nonlinearly to 
sample size because smaller samples have lower probabilities of including rare errors. Starbuck 
(2006: 163-164) gives more details about these simulations. 
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